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The Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under 
Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the District Court commit error in failing to 
enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the 
defendants/appellants Prodata, Inc. ("Prodata") and Will 
McCoy ("McCoy") based upon their post-trial contention that 
they conveyed only truthful information? 
Standard of Review; No deference is given to the 
trial court's view of the lawf but the appellate court 
reviews it for correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt 
Paving. Inc. v. Blomquist, 773, P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 
1989) . 
2. When viewed in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff/appellee, John P. Pratt ("Pratt"), was the 
evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding that 
Prodata and McCoy acted for an improper purpose in 
interfering with Pratt's economic relations with the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT")? (Special Verdict 
Question No. 2.) 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
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3. When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, 
was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that Prodata's and McCoy's intentional interference with 
Pratt's economic relations with UDOT proximately caused an 
injury to Pratt? (Special Verdict Question No. 4.) 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
4. When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, 
was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that Prodata and McCoy were not privileged to interfere 
with Pratt's economic relations with UDOT? (Special 
Verdict Question No. 5.) 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
5. When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, 
was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that Pratt did not recognize the risk of harm to himself by 
reason of the actions of Prodata and McCoy and thereafter 
intentionally or heedlessly fail to protect his own 
interests? (Special Verdict Question No. 6.) 
Standard of Review: Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988). 
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6. When viewed in the light most favorable to Pratt, 
was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's finding 
that Prodata suffered no actual damages by reason of 
Pratt's breach of the noncompetition clause in the Employee 
Agreement? (Special Verdict Question No. 10.) 
Standard of Review; Sufficiency of the evidence when 
viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 
prevailed. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14f 17 (Utah 1988). 
III. DETERMINATIVE LAW 
There is no constitutional provision, statute, 
ordinance, rule, or regulation whose interpretation is 
determinative of the issues on this appeal. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The plaintiff/appellee, John P. Pratt ("Pratt"), 
brought this action against the defendants/appellants 
Prodata, Inc. ("Prodata") and Will McCoy ("McCoy") for 
intentional interference with Pratt's economic relations 
with the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). Pratt 
also requested a declaratory judgment (1) that a 1985 "Non-
Disclosure/Non-Competitive Employment Agreement" between 
Pratt and Prodata (the "Employee Agreement") was modified 
and/or superseded by a subsequent "Type 3 - Independent 
Contractor Services Subcontract Services Agreement" between 
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the same parties (the "Subcontractor Agreement"), and (2) 
that he had not violated his contractual obligations under 
either of these agreements. (R. 2-13 and 45-61)x 
Prodata and McCoy denied that they had interfered with 
Pratt's economic relations and also set forth several 
affirmative defenses to Pratt's claims, including that they 
were privileged to act as they did and that Pratt himself 
had been the cause of his own injury. Prodata also 
asserted a counterclaim against Pratt, alleging that Pratt 
had breached the non-compete provisions of the Employee 
Agreement and requesting an award of $25,000 in liquidated 
damages. (R. 90-104.) Pratt denied that he had any 
liability under the Employee Agreement and alleged by way 
of affirmative defense that such agreement had been 
modified and/or superseded by the subsequent Subcontractor 
Agreement. (R. 69-74.)2 
XA11 references to the original record are in the form 
"R." followed by the page numbers. Similarly, references 
to the Reporter's transcript are in the form "T." followed 
by the page numbers. Trial Exhibits are referred to as 
"Ex." followed by the Exhibit number. Materials included 
in an Addendum to this brief are, in addition, identified 
as "Addendum" followed by the Addendum number. 
2Prodata's and McCoy's affirmative defenses of 
privilege and causation, together with Prodata's request 
for liquidated damages, were first asserted in a "Proposed 
Amended Answer and Counterclaim" filed on August 24, 1990. 
(R. 90-104.) Although filed pursuant to a Stipulation 
between the parties (R. 88-89), this amended pleading was 
never served upon Pratt, and Pratt never filed an amended 
Reply thereto. Nevertheless, the new issues raised by the 
amended pleading, as well as Pratt's additional defenses 
thereto (including Pratt's affirmative assertion that he 
was not liable for the specified liquidated damages), were 
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B. Course of Proceedings 
This case was tried to a jury on March 19-21, 1991. 
(R. 836.) The District Court directed a verdict in favor 
of Prodata and McCoy as to Pratt's claim for declaratory 
relief. (T. 405-06, R. 756-58.) The jury thereafter 
returned a Special Verdict in favor of Pratt both on 
Pratt's interference claim and on Prodata's counterclaim. 
(R. 700-04; Addendum l.)3 
deemed to have been properly and timely asserted. (See, 
e.g., R. 733 and 745.) 
3Just prior to trial, the District Court ruled that 
Pratt's proof of the "improper means" element in connection 
with his interference claim required proof of "each of the 
relevant elements of an independent tort by the standard 
of proof applicable to that tort under Utah law." (R. 538-
39.) It is submitted that this ruling is directly contrary 
to the Oregon rule which was expressly adopted by this 
Court. Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 
304 (Utah 1982) (Oregon definition expressly adopted); Top 
Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 283 Or. 201, 
582 P.2d 1365, 1371 n. 11 (1978) (proof of all elements of 
liability for another tort is not necessary)• Then, prior 
to instructing the jury, the District Court ruled that the 
only independent tort which had been adequately alleged by 
Pratt in his pleadings was that of intentional 
misrepresentation. (T. 405-08, R. 756-58.) The District 
Court accordingly instructed the jury that they could only 
find that Prodata and McCoy used "improper means" if they 
found that Pratt had proven certain elements of the 
independent tort of intentional misrepresentation by clear 
and convincing evidence. (R. 727-32; Addendum 11.) Pratt 
maintains that these rulings were clearly erroneous and 
improperly increased his burden of proof in this case. (T. 
408-09, R. 527-35.) Should this Court decide that further 
trial court proceedings are required in this case, 
therefore, appropriate clarification of these central 
issues is respectfully requested. 
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c
* Disposition in the District Court 
In accordance with the jury's verdict, Judgment was 
entered in favor of Pratt on March 27, 1991. (R. 759-60.) 
Prodata and McCoy moved for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, or in the alternative, for a new trial. (R. 765-
67.) Their motion was denied by the District Court (R. 
824-26), and Prodata and McCoy filed this appeal. (R. 827-
28.) 
D. Statement of the Facts 
Pratt is a computer consultant with over fifteen years 
of experience. (T. 1 and 13-14.) During that time, Pratt 
has become acquainted with some of the data processing 
personnel who now work for the Utah Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") (T. 23), and Pratt's skills are 
highly regarded by them. (T. 328.) 
In September of 1985, Pratt became employed by Prodata 
to provide data processing services. (T. 14.) In 
connection with this employment, Pratt signed an "Employee 
Non-Disclosure/Non-Competitive Employment Agreement" (the 
"Employee Agreement"). (T. 14-15, Ex. 11.) Among other 
things, the Employee Agreement prohibited Pratt from 
forming or otherwise participating in a competing business 
within 50 miles of Salt Lake City for one year following 
the termination of his employment. (Ex. 11, paragraph 9.) 
By written notice to Prodata, Pratt terminated the 
Employee Agreement effective May 1, 1988, (T. 15.) 
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Nevertheless, Prodata wanted Pratt's continued work on a 
project for the Utah Department of Employment Security 
("UDES"). Therefore, Prodata thereafter signed a "Type 3 
- Independent Contractor Services Subcontract Services 
Agreement" with Pratt (the "Subcontractor Agreement") to 
obtain Pratt's continuing services. (T. 16-19.) The 
Subcontractor Agreement did not require Pratt to work 
exclusively for Prodata and did not guarantee Pratt full 
time work. Rather, the Subcontractor Agreement 
acknowledged and engaged Pratt as an independent business 
providing competing services. The Subcontractor Agreement 
did, however, prohibit Pratt, for a period of six months 
after the termination of the Subcontractor Agreement, from 
competing with Prodata at the specific clients which were 
serviced by Pratt under the Agreement. (T. 22-23 and 167, 
Ex. 14.) 
In engaging Pratt under the Subcontractor Agreement, 
Prodata required Pratt to operate as a competing business, 
something which would otherwise have violated the Employee 
Agreement. (T. 19-20.) Pratt accordingly believed that 
the Subcontractor Agreement superseded his non-compete 
obligations under the Employee Agreement. (T. 20.)4 
Pratt terminated his Subcontractor Agreement with 
Prodata effective March 29, 1989. (T. 21-22, Ex. 26.) 
4See, e.g., Bradshaw v. Burninqham, 671 P.2d 196 (Utah 
1983) . 
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Pratt was asked by UDOT personnel to do some contract work 
at UDOT. (T. 23.) Pratt agreed and commenced providing 
services to UDOT on or about February 27, 1989. (T. 23-
24.) While engaged by Prodata under the Subcontractor 
Agreement, Pratt performed work exclusively for UDES. (T. 
20-21.) He performed no work for UDOT. (T. 23.) The 
parties accordingly agree that Pratt did not violate his 
Subcontractor Agreement by subsequently providing services 
to UDOT. (T. 22-23 and 129-30.) 
Pratt's departure from Prodata had no adverse effect 
upon the continuing work being done by Prodata at UDES. 
(T. 206.) Likewise, Pratt's subsequent work at UDOT did 
not hinder Prodata from performing work for UDOT during the 
same time period. (T. 153-54 and 165-66.) Nevertheless, 
McCoy, who was then Prodata's City Manager for Salt Lake 
City, was very unhappy with Pratt for leaving Prodata. 
(T. 193-94.) McCoy even told at least one Prodata employee 
to stay away from Pratt and openly accused Pratt of bad or 
unethical conduct (T. 202), although McCoy admits he knew 
of nothing bad Pratt had done. (T. 170.) 
During the summer of 1989, McCoy carefully reviewed 
Pratt's agreements with Prodata. As a result, McCoy 
concluded that Pratt had not violated his agreements. (T. 
134-36.) In fact, McCoy admits that he did not become 
aware of any basis for asserting a contract violation on 
the part of Pratt until September 26, 1989. (T. 136-40.) 
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Nevertheless, as early as June of 1989, McCoy referred to 
Pratt as having taken contract work away from Prodata, and 
McCoy openly stated that Prodata was going to "make an 
example" of Pratt. (T. 122-23.) 
In September of 1989, McCoy and Prodata learned that 
another former Prodata employee, Ron Hartle ("Hartle"), was 
providing services to UDOT. McCoy and Prodata believed 
that Hartle was in breach of his non-compete agreement with 
Prodata by so doing. Prodata's President, Bill Basham 
("Basham"), told Hartle that Prodata would get Hartle out 
of UDOT using "whatever means he could." (T. 285-86.) 
McCoy had previously been employed as the Comptroller 
for UDOT. (T. 127.) He knew the UDOT personnel. (T. 166-
67.) Treating Hartle and Pratt as a package (T. 152), 
McCoy met with UDOT officials on several occasions to 
discuss Hartle and Pratt. (T. 137-50.) At McCoy's 
request, UDOT conducted "an investigation" into the alleged 
non-compete violations using information supplied by McCoy. 
(T. 370-75.) UDOT ultimately consummated a "business 
arrangement" with McCoy to "clear up the matter." (T. 278-
79.) 
On October 2, 1989, the next business day, Pratt was 
summoned to the office of Neal Christensen, UDOT's Director 
of Administrative Services. Pratt was told that he was 
being terminated by UDOT effective immediately. (T. 2.) 
When he asked the reason, Pratt was told that he was being 
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terminated because of a conflict with Prodata and that he 
would not be considered for further work at UDOT until his 
differences with Prodata were resolved, (T. 3.) 
Pratt was totally surprised by UDOT's termination of 
his contract. He was not aware of any conflict he had with 
Prodata. (T. 3, 39-40.) In an effort to resolve the 
matter, Pratt arranged to meet with McCoy. McCoy told 
Pratt that he would clear Pratt for further work at UDOT if 
Pratt paid Prodata approximately $4,000. Pratt was 
shocked; he did not believe he owed Prodata anything and 
regarded the request as extortionate* (T. 4 and 65.) 
After Pratt left this meeting, McCoy was visibly pleased 
that Pratt would have to pay Prodata. (T. 120.) 
Pratt subsequently tried to resolve the matter with 
UDOT. Although UDOT personnel had freely met with and 
listened to McCoy, UDOT personnel would not listen to 
Pratt. (T. 4-13.) The sudden termination of Pratt's 
contract with UDOT left Pratt without work for several 
weeks. (T. 40-41 and 84-85.) Pratt ultimately succeeded 
in obtaining other work; however, Pratt was not permitted 
to do further work for UDOT. (T. 42-43.) Pratt finally 
commenced this civil action in an effort to resolve the 
matter. (T. 13.) 
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V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. Prattfs Interference Claim 
1. Improper Purpose and Privilege 
McCoy expressed groundless displeasure toward and 
criticism of Pratt over a period of several months. McCoy 
accused Pratt of taking contract work from Prodata and 
threatened to "make an example" of him many months before 
McCoy admittedly had any information which suggested to him 
that Pratt had done anything whatsoever improper. Neither 
Prodata nor McCoy ever approached Pratt about any alleged 
violation of his contract. Instead, they were intent on 
simply getting Pratt (with Hartle) out of UDOT no matter 
what it took. It was clearly an afterthought to use 
Pratt's alleged earlier violation of his then-expired non-
compete obligation as a business justification for 
interfering with Pratt's ongoing contract work for UDOT. 
2. Causation 
After Prodata and McCoy had intentionally interfered 
with Pratt's contract with UDOT, Pratt did all he could to 
resolve the matter with both Prodata and UDOT. Prodata and 
McCoy were ostensibly willing to clear Pratt for further 
work at UDOT if Pratt would only pay them money. However, 
Pratt did not believe he owed Prodata any money. Pratt 
certainly did not himself become a cause of the resulting 
injury to him simply because he would not make a requested 
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payment to Prodata, the party whose intentional conduct had 
caused the injury in the first place. 
3. Truthful Communication 
In view of their improper purpose in interfering with 
Pratt's contract with UDOT, Prodata and McCoy cannot avoid 
liability for their intentional interference simply because 
the means they purportedly employed (i.e., transmitting 
only truthful information) was allegedly proper. Moreover, 
there was no finding by the jury that Prodata and McCoy 
actually communicated "only truthful information to UDOT." 
In fact, this new defense was never raised before trial at 
all and is not properly before the Court on this appeal. 
B. Prodatafs Counterclaim 
There was substantial evidence to support the jury's 
finding that Prodata suffered no damages by reason of 
Pratt's alleged breach of his non-compete obligation. 
There was also substantial evidence that any actual damages 
suffered by Prodata were de minimis and grossly 
disproportionate to the specified liquidated damages. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
This Court has repeatedly "pointed out the importance 
of affording parties who desire it a trial by jury; and 
that the courts should exercise caution and reluctance in 
interfering with them." Schow v. Guardtone, Inc.. 18 Utah 
2d 135, 417 P.2d 643, 646 (1966). Prodata and McCoy assert 
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no basis which would justify disturbing the juryfs verdict 
in this case. 
A. The District Court's Judgment on Pratt's Interference 
Claim Should Be Affirmed, 
It is well established that a defendant is liable 
under Utah law for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations if it is proven "(1) that 
the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's 
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an 
improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing injury 
to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 
657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 1982). See also, Sampson v. 
Richins. 770 P.2d 998 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 776 P.2d 
916 (Utah 1989). 
While a defendant may prove a limited privilege for 
his actions by way of affirmative defense, it is likewise 
clear that any such privilege is not absolute. As aptly 
noted by the Supreme Court of Oregon, "[e]ven a recognized 
privilege may be overcome when the means used by defendant 
are not justified by the reason for recognizing the 
privilege." Top Service Body Shop, Inc. v. Allstate 
Insurance Co.. 283 Or. 201, 582 P.2d 1365, 1371 (1978) 
(case cited with approval by this Court in adopting the 
Oregon approach to this tort, see Leigh Furniture, supra, 
657 P.2d at 304.) See also. Sloan v. Journal Publishing 
Cg^, 213 Or. 324, 324 P.2d 449, 465 (1958) (defense of 
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privilege rejected, stating: "We find no justification for 
coercive tactics by the defendants, the effect of which is 
first to invade the exclusive functions of management and 
second to destroy profitable contractual rights of third 
parties, the plaintiffs.") Similarly, courts in other 
states have declined to recognize a privilege to interfere 
with the economic relations of another when such 
interference is motivated by a desire to injure or is 
accomplished by improper means. See, e.g.. Alyeska 
Pipeline Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service. Inc., 604 P.2d 
1090, 1093-94 (Alaska 1979) (the Court also noted that 
"[t]he question of justification for invading the 
contractual interest of another is normally one for the 
trier of fact, particularly when the evidence is in 
conflict"); Buckaloo v. Johnson. 14 Cal. 3d 815, 537 P.2d 
865, 872, 122 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1975). See also. Edwards v. 
Anaconda Co.. 115 Ariz. 313, 565 P.2d 190, 193 (Ariz. App. 
1977) ("This competitor's privilege does not apply to 
inducement of breach of contract but only to interference 
with business expectancies."). 
!• There is Substantial Evidence to 
Support the Jury's Finding That Prodata 
and McCoy Acted for an "Improper 
Purpose" and Were Not "Privileged." 
Over a period of several months, McCoy expressed 
anger, implied improper conduct, alleged contractual 
violations, and threatened to take action against Pratt, 
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for which there was admittedly no known factual or legal 
basis. Such conduct evidences ill will and an intent to 
injure Pratt for the sake of injury alone, rather than an 
intent merely to protect some legitimate business interest. 
For example, Mr. Clawson testified that McCoy was 
"very unhappy" at Pratt in February of 1989 when Pratt 
terminated his Subcontractor Agreement and left Prodata. 
(T. 193-94; Addendum 6.) There was clearly no legitimate 
business reason for this unhappiness. Pratt was 
unquestionably entitled to terminate his Subcontractor 
Agreement, and Mr. Read testified that the Prodata project 
on which Pratt had been working was not adversely affected 
at all. (T. 206; Addendum 7.) 
Similarly, Mr. Read testified that McCoy told him in 
April or May of 1989 to "stay away" from Pratt and that 
Pratt had done worse things than anything Mr. Read knew 
about. (T. 202; Addendum 7.) This apparent attempt to 
discredit Pratt was likewise not justified by any business 
purpose; Defendant McCoy admitted that he knew of nothing 
whatsoever Pratt had done which McCoy would consider bad. 
(T. 170; Addendum 5.) 
Then, according to Mr. Crocker, McCoy referred to 
Pratt in about June of 1989, accusing him of taking 
contracts away from Prodata and violating his non-compete 
obligation to Prodata, stating that Prodata was going to 
"make an example" of Pratt. (T. 122; Addendum 4.) By his 
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own admission, however, McCoy knew of no factual basis for 
claiming a contract violation by Pratt until September 26, 
1989. (T. 135-36; Addendum 5.) 
Mr. Hartle testified that Prodata and McCoy 
specifically told him they were going to get him out of 
UDOT by "whatever means [they] could." (T. 286; Addendum 
9.) From the defendants' admitted package treatment of Mr. 
Hartle and Pratt (T. 152; Addendum 5), therefore, it could 
reasonably be inferred that Prodata and McCoy had the same 
intent with respect to Pratt. In addition, Pratt met with 
McCoy after Pratt's contract at UDOT was terminated (T. 4; 
Addendum 2) ; and, according to Mr. Crocker, McCoy was 
visibly pleased after meeting with Pratt and announcing 
that Pratt would have to pay Prodata money. (T. 120; 
Addendum 4.) 
Further, although McCoy repeatedly met with and told 
others that he thought Pratt had violated his contract with 
Prodata, Prodata and McCoy admittedly never contacted Pratt 
about any alleged contract violation. (T. 130; Addendum 
5.) Instead, as Mr. Charles Christensen testified, McCoy 
said he made a "business arrangement" with UDOT to "clear 
up the matter." (T. 279; Addendum 8.) Other than this 
lawsuit, the only contact between Pratt and Prodata and 
McCoy concerning the alleged "problem" was initiated by 
Pratt. (T. 39-40; Addendum 2.) 
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Thus, although Prodata and McCoy claim that they were 
merely pursuing a legitimate business and economic 
objective of enforcing their employee and subcontractor 
agreements, there is substantial evidence that this alleged 
objective was in reality an afterthought. Much of the 
conduct of Prodata and McCoy referred to above admittedly 
took place before Prodata and McCoy were aware of any need 
to pursue their claimed objective, and any such objective 
cannot, therefore, justify such conduct. Rather, Prodatafs 
and McCoy's conduct leads one to the inescapable conclusion 
that Prodata and McCoy harbored ill feelings towards Pratt 
and were intent on injuring and "making an example" of him 
without any regard to whether there was a legitimate basis 
for their action. 
Quoting the Alaska Supreme Court, this Court in Leigh 
Furniture aptly explained: 
[I]f one does not act in a good faith attempt to 
protect his own interest or that of another but, 
rather, is motivated by a desire to injure the 
contract party, he forfeits the immunity afforded 
by the privilege. . . . In the case at bar, the 
central factual issue . . . was whether Alyeska 
was genuinely furthering its own economic and 
safety interests or was using them as a facade 
for inflicting injury upon Aurora. There was 
sufficient evidence upon which the jury could 
properly find that Alyeska was acting out of ill 
will towards Aurora, rather than to protect a 
legitimate business interest. 
Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 308 
(Utah 1982) (Emphasis in original; quoting Alyeska Pipeline 
Service Co. v. Aurora Air Service, Inc., 604 P.2d 1090, 
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1094 (Alaska 1979)). Likewise in this case, there is 
clearly substantial evidence to support the jury's finding 
that Prodata and McCoy acted for an "improper purpose" and 
were not "privileged." 
2. There is Substantial Evidence to Support the 
Jury's Finding That the Conduct of Prodata and 
McCoy Proximately Caused an Injury to Pratt. 
It is undisputed that UDOT based its decision to 
terminate Pratt's contract solely upon information provided 
by Prodata and McCoy. (T. 370-75; Addendum 10.) Moreover, 
UDOT's Director, Mr. Findlay, testified that Pratt's 
contract with UDOT would not have been terminated if it had 
not been for the alleged conflict between Pratt and 
Prodata. (T. 102; Addendum 3.) 
In addition, UDOT officials had several meetings with 
McCoy prior to terminating Pratt's contract, and they also 
reported the termination to Prodata and McCoy afterwards. 
(T. 137-50; Addendum 5.) UDOT obviously wanted input from 
Prodata and McCoy and believed they had an interest in the 
matter. At the same time, it is undisputed that Pratt was 
neither informed nor asked about the proposed contract 
termination before it became effective. (T. 3; Addendum 
2.) There can be no doubt that Pratt's contract with UDOT 
would not have been terminated absent the conduct of 
Prodata and McCoy. 
Prodata and McCoy do not challenge the jury's finding 
that they intentionally interfered with Pratt's economic 
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relations with UDOT. In fact, they now admit that their 
conduct actually caused the termination of Pratt's contract 
with UDOT. (Brief of Appellants at p. 29.) Nevertheless, 
Prodata and McCoy contend that Pratt is somehow himself the 
cause of any damages he suffered because he did not accept 
their "offer" of settlement. 
It is undisputed that Pratt contacted both UDOT and 
McCoy in an effort to resolve this matter. McCoy demanded 
a "settlement" payment from Pratt which he did not believe 
he owed. Pratt accordingly concluded that further 
discussions with Prodata and McCoy would be unproductive, 
and such discussions were likewise not pursued further by 
Prodata and McCoy. Nevertheless, Pratt thereafter tried 
for several months to resolve the matter directly with 
UDOT. Only after those efforts failed did Pratt resort to 
litigation. (T. 4-13; Addendum 2.) 
Contrary to the assertions of Prodata and McCoy, 
therefore, there is absolutely no evidence that Pratt 
"intentionally or heedlessly" failed to protect his own 
interests. On the contrary, there is substantial, if not 
uncontroverted, evidence that Pratt undertook reasonable 
efforts to remedy the termination of his contract at UDOT 
and thereafter initiated litigation only when those efforts 
failed. 
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3* The Alleged Transmission of Only Truthful 
Information Does Not Relieve Prodata and McCoy 
From Liability in This Case, 
Prodata and McCoy urge that they are immune from 
liability for intentional interference with Pratt's 
economic relations because they transmitted only truthful 
information. This contention must, however, fail for at 
least three reasons. 
First, Prodata and McCoy apparently assert that their 
allegedly "proper means" (transmitting truthful 
information) cures any "improper purpose." Such a position 
is, however, contrary to established Utah law. As this 
Court has clearly explained, 
The alternative of improper purpose (or 
motive, intent, or objective) will support a 
cause of action for intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations even where the 
defendant's means were proper. 
Leiah Furniture, supra, 657 P. 2d at 307 (Emphasis 
supplied). It is accordingly submitted that the argument 
of Prodata and McCoy confuses the "improper means" and 
"improper purpose" alternatives. The jury having found 
that Prodata and McCoy had an "improper purpose," the 
alleged propriety of their "means" (transmitting truthful 
information) is wholly irrelevant. 
Second, the jury did not make the necessary factual 
finding to support this contention of Prodata and McCoy. 
The jury was asked to determine whether Pratt had proven by 
clear and convincing evidence that Prodata and McCoy 
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knowingly made a false statement of fact to UDOT. (R. 700-
04 and 727-32; Addenda 1 and 11.) The jury's negative 
finding on that issue, however, does not equate to the 
asserted affirmative finding that Prodata and McCoy 
conveyed "only truthful information." That issue was never 
submitted to the jury for determination. 
Finally, the arguments made to the District Court 
suggest that Prodata and McCoy regard "truthfulness" as a 
new affirmative defense. (R. 811-14.) To the extent this 
is so, such a defense was neither raised by the pleadings 
nor urged as a basis for instructing the jury. It is 
respectfully submitted, therefore, that any such defense 
has been waived and is not properly before this Court on 
appeal. See, e.g., Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c) and 51. 
B. There is Substantial Evidence to Support the Judgment 
in Pratt's Favor on the Counterclaim. 
Even assuming that Pratt performed services at UDOT 
for approximately two months during which he was obligated 
not to compete with Prodata, Pratt is not liable for 
liquidated damages if: (1) Prodata suffered no actual 
damages or (2) the specified liquidated damages are 
excessive in view of the actual damages. Young Electric 
Sign Co. v. United Standard West, Inc., 755 P.2d 162, 164 
(Utah 1988). There is sufficient evidence to justify the 
District Court's Judgment on either of these grounds. 
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For example, Mr. Read testified that the project on 
which Pratt was working before he left Prodata in February 
of 1989 was not adversely affected at all by Pratt's 
departure. (T. 202; Addendum 7.) There was, therefore, 
direct evidence that Prodata suffered no actual damages. 
Pratt testified that his services were specifically 
requested by UDOT personnel who had known Pratt before he 
became associated with Prodata. (T. 23; Addendum 2.) In 
addition, during the same time Pratt performed work for 
UDOT, Prodata continued its contract work at UDOT unabated, 
even after Pratt's contract work at UDOT was terminated. 
(T. 165-66; Addendum 5.) Thus, the evidence also directly 
refutes any inference that Pratt traded upon Prodata's name 
or goodwill in obtaining his contract at UDOT or that 
Prodata otherwise suffered any injury to its goodwill or 
reputation as a result of Pratt's work. 
Further, while there is no evidence that Prodata would 
have actually performed Pratt's 1989 contract work at UDOT, 
Pratt offered evidence that Prodata would only have 
realized about $2,000 from such contract work done prior to 
May of 1989 (the period of time during which Pratt was 
allegedly in breach of his non-compete obligation). (T. 
82-83; Addendum 2.) Thus, there is also evidence that any 
actual damages suffered by the defendants were grossly 
disproportionate to the requested $2 5,000 in liquidated 
damages. 
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In view of the foregoing, there is clearly substantial 
evidence to support the jury's finding that the defendants 
suffered no actual damages. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Prodata and McCoy have asserted no legitimate basis 
which would justify disturbing the jury's verdict and the 
District Court's Judgment. The Judgment of the District 
Court should accordingly be affirmed. 
DATED this 3Q — day of September, 1991. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Berne S. Broadbent 
1200 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-1800 
Attorney for Appellee 
BRO/1016A1.45 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. PRATT, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRODATA, INC., et al., 
Defendants. 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
CIVIL NO. 900902742 CV 
We, the jury, now answer the following questions as our 
verdict in this case: 
1. Did the defendants intentionally interfere with the 
plaintiff's economic relations with the Utah Department of 
Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes )C No 
If your answer to question 1 is NO, do not answer questions 
2 through 7, and proceed directly to question 8. 
2. Did the defendants act for an improper purpose in 
interfering with the plaintiff's economic relations with the 
Utah Department of Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
-2-
3# Ip determining whether the defendants employed 
improper means in interfering with the plaintiff's economic 
relations with the Utah Department of Transportation, please 
answer the following: 
a% Did the defendants make a false statement about a 
presently existing fact to the Utah Department of 
Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes No V 
b. Did the defendants know that the statement was 
false or make the statement without sufficient knowledge? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
C. Did the defendants, in making the statement, 
intend to induce the Utah Department of Transportation to 
act in reliance on the statement? 
ANSWER: Yes V No 
d. Did the Utah Department of Transportation act 
with justification on the statement? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If your answer to question 2 and your answer to any of the 
four subparts of question 3 i£3t NO, do not answer questions 4 
through 7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
-3-
4. Did the defendants' intentional interference with the 
plaintiff's economic relations with the Utah Department of 
Transportation proximately cause an injury to the plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes X No 
If your answer to question 4 is NO, do not answer questions 
5 through 7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
5. Were the defendants privileged to interfere with the 
plaintiff's economic relations with the Utah Department of 
Transportation? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
£££ 
If your answer to question 5 is **r, do not answer questions 
6 and 7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
6. Did the plaintiff recognize the risk of harm to 
himself by reason of the defendants' actions but thereafter 
intentionally or heedlessly fail to protect his own interests? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
£££ 
If your answer to question 6 is « , do not answer question 
7 and proceed directly to question 8. 
7. State the amount of the plaintiff's out-of-pocket and 
consequential damages caused by the defendants' interference 
-4-
with the plaintiff's existing or future economic relations with 
8. Did the defendant Prodata waive enforcement of the 
noncompetition clause in the Employment Agreement? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If your answer to question 8 is YES, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court, 
9. Did the defendant Prodata inexcusably delay asserting 
the plaintiff's breach of contract, thereby prejudicing the 
plaintiff? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
0*3 
If your answer to question 9 is tttr, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
10. Did the defendant Prodata suffer actual damages by 
reason of the plaintiff's breach of the noncompetition clause 
in the Employment Agreement? 
ANSWER: Yes No X 
If your answer to question 10 is NO, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
007{;; 
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11. Did there exist a reasonable relationship between the 
$25,000 set as liquidated damages in the Employment Agreement 
and the actual damages to be contemplated as arising from a 
breach at the time that the Employment Agreement was signed? 
ANSWER: Yes No 
If your answer to question 11 is NO, do not answer any 
further questions. Instead, the foreperson should sign the 
Special Verdict where provided below and notify the Court. 
12. State the defendant Prodata#s damages proximately 
caused by the plaintiff's breach of the Employment Agreement. 
$ 
Dated this Z / day of March, 1991. 
Tab 2 
1 Mr, Christensen1s office that your contract might be 
2 terminated? 
3 A Absolutely none. 
4 Q You had no idea that your contract was even in 
5 jeopardy? 
6 A No. 
7 Q At that time did you have an understanding or get 
8 an understanding from Mr. Christensen as to why your contract 
9 was being terminated? 
10 A A very vague understanding, yes. 
11 Q What was the understanding that you got at that 
12 time? 
13 A He told me that there were some conflicts between 
14 Pro-Star and me that I needed to resolve prior to continuing 
15 my work there. 
16 J Q And Pro-Star is the Defendant in this case? 
A Yes, that's correct. 
Q Had Pro-Star ever told you that there was a con-
flict between you and them that you needed to worry about? 
A Not a word, no. 












Q So what did you do then? 
A There wasn't much to do. I left, 
Q Did you try to resolve things with Pro-Star? 
A Yes, I contacted Will McCoy a couple of days later, 
asked him if we could have a meeting. 
Q Did you have a meeting? 
A We did. 
Q And during the course of that meeting, was there 
some discussion about what would resolve the matter as far as 
Pro-Star was concerned? 
A Yes, Pro-Star said that if I'd pay them some money, 
they would write a letter to UDOT clearing me. 
Q They'd clear you to get back — 
A Clearing me to get back in, yes. 
Q Did you pay them some money? 
A No, I didn't owe them anything. 
Q Were you able to resolve anything with Pro-Star? 
A I wasn't, no. Will McCoy told me to talk to his 
attorney from then on. 
Q Did you try and do anything else to resolve this? 
A I contacted Mr. Christensen, oh, a half dozen 
times, I don't recall, it may have been more than that, 
trying to get him to listen to reason on the thing. He 
basically just said until I had a letter from Pro-Star that 
he wasn't going to change his position. 
Q Did you feel like he listened to your position? 
A Not at all. 
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1 MR. BROADBENT: Your Honor, may I approach the 
2 witness? 
3 THE COURT: You may. 
4 Counsel, I note there are numerous exhibits that 
5 have been premarked. 
6 MR. BROADBENT: Yes. 
7 THE COURT: Will there be objection to any of those 
8 exhibits being received, Counsel, that you anticipate? 
9 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, we've filed with the Court 
10 a stipulation which I believe lists 17 exhibits, the first 17 
11 numbered under Plaintiff which are admitted as far as the 
12 parties are concerned. 
13 MR. BROADBENT: That's correct. 
14 THE COURT: Very well, Exhibits 1 through 17 are 
15 thereby admitted by stipulation. 
16 MR. BROADBENT: That's right. 
17 THE COURT: We need not lay foundation. Let's 
18 proceed. 
19 MR. OLSON: I believe further that on all their 
20 exhibits the foundational objections have been waived and 
21 it's simply a question of relevance, I believe, which is 
22 reserved by the parties. 
23 THE COURT: Very well. 
24 Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Mr. Pratt, I've handed you what 
25 has been marked and by stipulation submitted as evidence in 
5 
this case, as Exhibit No. 8. Let me just put a copy of this 
exhibit so the jury can see what you're looking at. 
Do you recognize this document? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Is this a letter that you wrote? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Would you read, please, the first paragraph of that 
letter? 
A Yes. 
"In light of our telephone conversation of November 
8 in which you stated that UDOT would not reinstate my 
contract, I am requesting that you put in writing the circum-
stances that led to the contract cancellation." 
Q Had you ever, in fact, asked Mr. Christensen to 
reinstate your contract at UDOT? 
A Many times. 
Q And had you told him that you had not been able to 
resolve anything with Pro-Star? 
A Yes. 
Q And he had, in fact, refused to reinstate your 
contract? 
A Yes. 
Q And in the last part of that first sentence you 
say, "I am requesting that you put in writing the circum-
stances that led to the contract cancellation." 
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Had you ever been told what those circumstances 
were? 
A Only as I've described, in the very broadest of 
terms. 
Q Mr. Pratt, why don't you now read the next para-
graph down to where it says, "Second," just all but the last 
sentence of the next paragraph. 
A "The reason for this request is two-fold. First, 
as I mentioned in our previous meetings, there have been 
rumors circulating regarding the reasons for contract termi-
nation which have caused damage to my reputation as a con-
tractor. These rumors abound at UDOT and have spread to 
other state agencies and possibly to other companies. A 
letter would document the real circumstances leading to the 
cancellation of my contract and provide written evidence that 
the rumors are incorrect." 
Q Had you personally heard rumors about your contract 
cancellation? 
A Yes, I had. 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I'd like to make an objec-
tion to the testimony about rumors. I think that's pretty 
much irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, the witness has already 
answered the last question. 
MR. OLSON: Well, my objection will be on the 
7 
record, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Where you mentioned in your 
letter that these rumors had spread to other state 
agencies — 
A Yes? 
Q — which other agencies had you heard these rumors 
at? 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I again object to this line 
of questioning on rumors in that it's irrelevant to the 
claims being made in this action. 
THE COURT: What do you claim for it, Counsel, 
Mr. Broadbent? 
MR. BROADBENT: We believe that the rumor evidence 
here is relevant to prove intent, to prove the fact that this 
had some impact on his ability to get a job outside of UDOT. 
THE COURT: I think the witness can testify as to 
what he deems to be damage and/or intent and/or employment 
prospects, but the issue of rumors circulating I deem to be 
irrelevant. The objection's sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Would you read the last para-
graph — or the last sentence of that second paragraph? 
A Yes. "Second, the terms of the standard contract 
which we both signed required 30 days written notice in order 
to cancel the contract." 
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1 Q Had you received any notice at all? 
2 A No. 
3 Q You hadn't received any written notice? 
4 A Nothing in writing and no notice at all. 
5 Q Go ahead and read on in the letter. 
6 A Okay. "Please address the following issues in your 
7 letter. How did you first learn of the problem?" 
8 Q Had you ever been told how they first learned of 
9 the problem? 
10 A Just in that one meeting. Nc, I hadn't been told 
11 how they learned of it. 
12 Q That was your meeting with Mr. Christensen that 
13 you've just been talking about? 
14 A That's correct. 
15 Q And that was just a very vague reference to some 
16 disagreements; is that about what you'd been told? 
17 A Yes, yes. 
18 Q Second question. 
19 A "What are the specific allegations Pro-Star made?" 
20 Q Were you aware or had you been told that there were 
21 some allegations Pro-Star had made? Is that why you asked 
22 that question? 
23 MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I object to that. That 
24 would be hearsay, I believe, unless there's some more founda-
25 tion laid. 
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MR. BROADBENT: I think the fact that he's heard 
the allegations, your Honor, is important for him seeking to 
resolve this with UDOT to try and find out what was the 
problem. 
THE COURT: May be important, Counsel, but it 
doesn't solve the objection. The objection as to hearsay is 
sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Okay, Had you ever been told 
about any specific allegations Pro-Star made? 
A Not specifically, no. 
Q What's the third question? 
A "What is the supporting evidence?" 
Q Had you ever been shown any supporting evidence? 
A None at all. 
Q Had you ever seen any evidence that would support 
your termination of that contract? 
A No. 
Q Fourth question. 
A "What is UDOT's legal interest in the matter?" 
Q Explain to the jury why you asked that question. 
A The reason I asked that question is that apparently 
they perceived there was a problem between me and Pro-Star. 
In my mind, that was a problem between the two parties. I 
was not understanding why UDOT would jump in, terminate the 
contract, and then with me being economically disadvantaged 
10 
say, "Now, go work it out." 
Q Go ahead and read the last question. 
A "Why was I not allowed to answer the charges?" 
Q Were you, in fact, not allowed to answer those 
charges? 
A Never, no. 
Q Were you ever given an opportunity to explain your 
position? 
A No. 
Q Go ahead and finish the letter, please, Mr. Pratt. 
A "I am sure you appreciate the emotional and finan-
cial difficulty that the sudden and unexpected cancellation 
of my contract with UDOT has caused my family and me over the 
past five weeks. A letter of explanation could help me sort 
out this problem and restore my damaged reputation. I would 
appreciate your prompt response." 
Q Did you ever receive a response to this letter? 
A I did. 
Q I show you what's been previously marked as Exhibit 
10 — pardon me, Exhibit 9. Is this a copy of the response 
you received? 
A It is. 
Q Would you read that response? 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I can foresee when we 
get through with 35 or 36 exhibits, if the witness is going 
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to read them each to us, that we'll be here a considerable 
time. 
I note for the record that you have an overhead 
viewer and screen which I believe all of the jurors have 
previously indicated they can see, so the whole purpose, it 
seems to me, of having the visual demonstration is to avoid 
the necessity of having the witness read to us what the 
exhibit says, 
MR. BROADBENT: So long as all the jurors can read 
what's on the overhead, I have no problem. 
THE COURT: Are there any members of the jury who 
cannot see or read the letter that's on the screen? 
There are none, Counsel, so we can dispense with 
the reading. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Let's take just a minute then 
and read through that letter. 
Mr. Pratt, in the second paragraph of this letter 
it indicates that he will give you a formal response to your 
request after he returns to the office on November 27. Did 
you ever get a formal response? 
A No, I never did. 
Q Did you ever get any response to those five ques-
tions that you've mentioned in your previous letter? 
A No response to those at all. 
Q Did you get any other communication from UDOT? 
12 
1 A Yes, I did. After repeated attempts to try and get 
2 something out of them, I was finally sent a letter by Neal 
3 Christensen. 
4 Q Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 10, 
5 and I'll pause for just a moment to allow the jury to review 
6 this letter. 
7 Is this a copy of the next response you got from 
8 UDOT? 
9 A Yes, it is. 
10 Q Were you ever able to resolve the matter with UDOT? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Has your company since done any contract work for 
13 UDOT? 
14 A No. 
15 Q To your knowledge, have there been outside consul-
16 tants who have done work at UDOT? 
17
 A Yes, several that I know. 
18
 Q Did you have any other conversations with 
19 Mr. Christensen after you received this letter? 
20
 A I don't recall if I had any conversations. I mean, 
21
 J I had enough to be satisfied that he was not going to accept 
anything I said and that his position was firmly fixed. 
Q And so what did you do next? 
A I came to you. 






Q And that's the language that you were just refer-
ring to where it says that you can't compete with Pro-Star at 
the contractor clients that have been serviced by the 
subcontractor? 
A That's correct. 
Q And you hadn't done any work for UDOT? 
A No, I had not. 
Q At the time you went to UDOT, did you believe that 
that violated any contractual obligation that you had to 
Prodata? 
A No, I did not. 
Q How did your company obtain the contract to work at 
UDOT? 
A Lorin Sheffield called me and I'm not clear as to 
when this was, but sometime in February, and asked if I would 
be willing to bid on some work at UDOT. 
Q Who was Lorin Sheffield? 
A Lorin Sheffield was one of the programming managers 
— I don't know his exact title — out at the Department of 
Transportation and a person I've known for approximately 15 
years. 
Q Did you know him before you started working for 
Pro-Star? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And when did you start working at UDOT? 
23 
1 nothing to do with that. Your friend did it to youfM and I 
2 presume that he was meaning Ron Hartle. 
3 I said, "You mean Ron Hartle?" 
4 And he said, "That's your — " Something to the 
5 effect, "Those are your words, not mine," and I proceeded to 
6 explain to him that it was not my understanding that Ron 
7 Hartle had done this but that — excuse me — Pro-Star had 
8 done it, that Will McCoy specifically had done it, and I 
9 asked them what they wanted from me. He said that if I paid 
10 him money, that they would clear me at UDOT and I could get 
11 back in. 
12 Q Were there any other discussions in that meeting 
13 about your contract obligations to Pro-Star? 
14 A Not to my recollection. 
15 Q Okay. Have you ever believed that you have vio-
16 J lated either of your contracts with Pro-Star? 
A No. 
Q As you sit here today, do you believe you violated 
those contracts? 
A No. 
Q Before you filed this lawsuit, did Pro-Star take 
any action against you or try and pursue you for any alleged 
violation of the contract? 
A Pro-Star did not do one thing, did not say one 











in any way until after we filed this action tnat they felt 
like I'd violated — well, I take that back. Until our 
meeting they did not indicate in any way to me that they felt 
I had violated my contract. 
Q And this is a meeting that occurred when? 
A It occurred several days after I was terminated at 
UDOT. 
Q After October 2nd? 
A Yes. 
Q You previously referred to Ron Hartle. Would you 
just explain so the record's clear on that, who is Ron 
Hartle? 
A Ron Hartle is a former employee of Prodata. I've 
known Ron for many, many years also. I've known him for 
about 12 or 13 years which predates either our association 
with Prodata. He was working at the Department of Transpor-
tation at the same time I was and we were acquaintances. 
Q At the time your contract with UDOT was terminated, 
did your company have other contracts that it was working on? 
A No, we did not at that time. 
Q What did you do after October 2nd with respect to 
your work? 
A I started looking for other contracts. 
Q Let me show you what's been marked as Exhibit 27. 
I ask you if you recognize that document. 
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1 MR. OLSON: I have nothing further. 
2 THE COURT: All right. Any redirect? 
3 MR. BROADBENT: Yes. 
4 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. BROADBENT: 
6 Q Mr. Prattf in the Complaint in this action have you 
7 alleged that you are doing business as Computer Solutions? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Have you alleged that the acts that took place at 
10 UDOT were done while you were doing business as Computer 
11 Solutions? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q When you had discussions with Pro-Star about trying 
14 to resolve this, was there any discussion about them compen-
15 sating you for losses of your contract at UDOT? 
16 J A I recall bringing that up and it was essentially 
laughed at. I mean, it was just — they considered that to 
be a joke. They denied any connection whatsoever to my 
contract termination at UDOT and so, you know, therefore, 
they didn't feel there was any basis for damages, I guess. 
Q You testified that while you were at UDOT that you 
were billing your time out at $45 an hour; is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q And while you were under subcontract at least with 












Q Was Pro-Star billing your time out at $45 an hour 
under the subcontract? 
A No, they weren't. 
Q Do you know how much they were billing your time 
for? 
A To the best of my recollection, it was 38.60 or 
something. It was a very odd amount. I think it was 38.60. 
I've got my calculator still. 
Q Good. Let's do another calculation. What is 227 
times $38 an hour? 
A 38.60. It comes out to $8,762, $8,762.20. 
Q Did I get that right? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay, and you've previously done the calculation 
for 227 times 26.50, sixty-one fifteen fifty. What's the 
difference between those two, Mr. Pratt? 
A $2,646.70. 
Q Twenty-seven forty-six seventy? 
A That's correct. 
Q So if you'd been working for Pro-Star under their 
subcontract for those 227 hours, they would have not made 
forty-one ninety-nine fifty, they would have made twenty-
seven forty-six seventy; isn't that right? 
A Under that subcontract, that's right. 
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him, how long were those meetings? 
A Oh, anywhere from 15, 20 minutes. There may have 
been one that extended into an hour. 
Q Did the fact that Mr. Pratt had a conflict or that 
it had been alleged that he had a conflict with Pro-Star have 
anything to do with your decision to terminate Mr. Pratt? 
A Yes. 
Q Would Mr. Pratt's contract have been terminated by 
UDOT if there had not been a conflict between him and Pro-
Star? 
A No, the contract would not have been terminated. 
Q Was there some understanding in your mind as to 
what Mr. Pratt would have to do in order to get his contract 
reinstated at UDOT? 
A Yes. 
Q What was your understanding? 
A Well, it was my understanding that he would have to 
work out an agreement with Pro-Star so that there would be no 
— that he would have satisfied all of his obligations with 
Pro-Star so that there would be no continuing obligation 
there and that he would be a totally free agent then to 
contract in his own behalf. 
Q And did you at any time become aware that Mr. Pratt 




A John Pratt. 
Q And do you think the other one was Ron Hartle? 
A I think the other one was Ron Hartle but I'm not 
sure. 
Q Did Will McCoy ever say what happened in that 
meeting? 
A After the meeting, Mr. McCoy came out and basically 
addressed the individuals that were present, indicating that 
Mr. Pratt was going to give up his contract at UDOT and pay 
some form of restitution. 
Q But did Mr. McCoy have any particular emotion when 
he came out? Was he sad? Angry? Happy? 
A I would say — 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I would like a little more 
foundation, and I think the question should be rephrased such 
that it relates to this individual's observation as opposed 
to simply a statement on Mr. McCoy's — 
THE COURT: Well, the question is leading. The 
objection is sustained. Let's form it in a nonleading 
fashion, Counsel. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Okay. Did you see Mr. McCoy 
express any emotion when he came out from that meeting? 
A In my opinion, he was quite pleased. He was 
smiling, laughing, seemed to be in good spirits. 
Q Did it appear to you that he was happy about the 
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briefly on this matter? 
THE COURT: Very well. 
(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of 
the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.) 
MR. BROADBENT: Could we approach the bench for 
just a moment? 
(Whereupon, discussion was held at the bench out of 
the hearing of the jury and the Reporter.) 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Mr. Crocker, have you now told 
us everything that you can remember that Pro-Star or 
Mr. McCoy said to you regarding John Pratt? 
A Well, no, not really. 
Q Specifically, and we're not interested in things 
that are just office conversation kinds of things, but tell 
us anything else that you remember that you haven't told us 
about already, any other statement that Mr. McCoy has made 
regarding John Pratt and we'll — 
A Okay. What I have to do is back up in time. Not 
knowing at the time who John Pratt was and not having his 
name mentioned, a statement at a luncheon by Mr. McCoy and 
also backed up by Mr. Basham was that contractors had taken 
contracts, consequently, money away from Pro-Star, that they 
had violated their no compete clause and Pro-Star intended to 
make an example of them. 
Q Do you remember when that statement was made? 
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A I am not. We've given it to counsel, but as far as 
I know, we don't think it is. Personally, I don't think it's 
in violation. 
Q Do you remember speaking with John Pratt about a 
contract violation issue in October of 1989? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q And prior to that time, you hadn't spoken to 
Mr. Pratt at all about any possible violation of this con-
tract, had you? 
A I had not. 
Q And you're not aware of anybody else at Pro-Star 
that contacted Mr. Pratt about a possible contract violation, 
are you? 
A No. 
Q Let's take our Exhibit 40 here, Mr. McCoy, just to 
keep these different, we'll use a different color dot, and 
let's put some times on this line here. 
If I understand the allegations that you're making 
in this case, it's that Mr. Pratt violated an employee agree-
ment; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And would you put on this chart a dot that shows 
when that competition clause expired, when his duty not to 
compete ended? 
A I will. As a question, is the first of the month 
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Q And when you advised Bill Basham, he indicated that 
you were to assure that you looked at the agreements and made 
sure there was not a violation of those agreements; isn't 
that true? 
A That is true. 
Q And you personally pulled the file in the summer of 
1989, didn't you? 
A That is correct. 
Q And you looked at the contracts at that time? 
A Correct. 
Q You looked at both the employee agreement that 
we've talked about and the subcontractor agreement? 
A Yes, we did. 
Q Can you fix an exact date? Could we put a dot on 
this chart indicating when you reviewed the contracts or just 
a general time frame like this? 
A It was within, I would say, a day, my first sight-
ing of Mr. Pratt, it was basically the same time. 
Q Okay, go ahead then, we'll just put this on the 
chart there, as well, in mid summer of 1989. 
Now, when you reviewed the employee agreement and 
the subcontractor agreement at that time, you reached a 
decision as to whether there had been a violation, in your 
mind, hadn't you? 
A In my mind, I had, yes. 
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Q And the decision you reached was that there had not 
been a violation either of those contracts; isn't that right? 
A That is correct, 
Q And you didn't contact your attorney at that time? 
A I did not. 
Q And the reason you didn't contact your attorney is 
because you had concluded that it was so clear there was no 
contract violation, you didn't see a need to contact him; 
isn't that right? 
A That was based on the conclusion that he had 
actually started work in the time frame that I'd seen him at 
mid summer of 1989, and that's correct. 
Q And that's what you say is all you know when you 
reviewed those contracts was that you just saw him in mid 
summer? 
A My assumption was that that was when he started. 
Q Now, you said you became aware of some additional 
facts about John Pratt in late September of 1989; is that 
correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And this is when you got a letter from Ron Hartle's 
attorney? 
A Correct. 
Q And this letter from Ron Hartle's attorney mentions 
John Pratt, doesn't it? 
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A It does. 
Q I believe we've referred to this. This is Exhibit 
15. Is this a copy of the letter that you received from Ron 
Hartle's attorney? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q Let me refer you to the second page of this docu-
ment there, the first full paragraph where it says, "There is 
a third reason why the noncompetition agreement is not 
enforceable. A subcontractor of your client by the name of 
John Pratt was in the same situation as Ron Hartle. 
Mr. Pratt's subcontract expired in February 1989. It had the 
same noncompetition provision in it as does Mr. Hartle's 
contract. In April 1989 he entered into a direct contract 
with UDOT for computer services," and it goes on and talks 
about some other things, and is that the additional informa-
tion that you say you learned? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And once you had received that additional informa-
tion, you took some steps at that point then to do some 
additional investigation, didn't you? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q And what you did is you called the Utah Department 
of Transportation and tried to get some documents from them 
to show when he'd started work; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
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Q And you told Bill Basham that that's what you were 
going to do, that you were going to go to UDOT and obtain 
documents to see if they could indicate a possibility of a 
contract violation; is that right? 
A I'm not real sure on that. We discussed it at some 
time but — 
Q Do you remember discussing it with Bill Basham? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Is that the gist of what — do you have a different 
recollection of what was said? 
A It may have been after I attempted to do that, the 
time frame is off, but I did discuss it with him. 
Q And in attempting to get these documents, you 
contacted Lorin Sheffield; is that correct? 
A Originally I did ask Lorin to confirm. 
Q And he said he couldn't help you; is that right? 
A That's correct. 
Q And then you contacted Gary Williams in the comp-
troller's office; is that right? 
A Yes, I attempted to contact several other people 
prior to that. 
Q And you contacted Harold Worrall also about getting 
these documents? 
A I attempted to contact Mr. Worrall first. 
Q And you requested invoices and payment vouchers 
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1 from UDOT, didn't you? 
2 A Yes, I did. 
3 Q And following your request, the very next day you 
4 got some of those documents; is that correct? 
5 A That is correct. 
6 Q And you did not have to talk to anybody at the 
7 Attorney General's Office to get those documents? 
8 A I did not. 
9 Q You didn't have to pay for copy costs? 
10 A I did not. 
H Q After getting these documents — let me refer you 
12 to Exhibit 1. Actually, as I remember your testimony, that 
13 probably wasn't — let's look at Exhibit 2 instead. 
*
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UDOT in response to your request? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And from this document, did you conclude at that 
point that there was a contract violation or that there 
appeared to be — 
A There appeared to be a violation, yes. 
Q And what is it on these documents that you saw that 
indicated there was a contract violation, in your mind? 
A On both the first page and the second page the 
r§quest is for consulting services February 27 through 
April 30, 1989, $10,215. 
Q And so the difference then is that you claim that 
here you didn't know that he was working at UDOT back in this 
early March, April time frame, and now you got some documents 
that indicated that he was; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And so once you got those documents, that's the 
first time that you had any belief that there was a contract 
violation; is that your testimony? 
A That is correct. 
Q Do you remember when you got Mr. Hartle — the 
letter from Mr. Hartle's attorney? 
A I received it on September 26th. 
Q Let's have you, Mr. McCoy, take you back to 
Exhibit 40, and would you put a green dot as close as we can 
get it to September 26th here on this time line? 
A Okay. 
Q Now, when you got these documents, you also learned 
of another problem with John Pratt's contract at UDOT, didn't 
you? 
A I did not have evidence, but I suspected that there 
was something else. 
Q And this additional problem had to do with the fact 
that he was paid without a contract being in force; is that 
right? 
A I did not know that to be factual at that time, but 
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that was my suspicion. 
Q And once you had that suspicion, you went to 
Mr. Sheffield and told him about that suspicion; isn't that 
right? 
A What I did — I'm trying to think — with 
Mr. Sheffield, the first thing I did when I got the letter 
was updated him on Mr. Hartle again and advised him that 
Mr. Hartle had brought Mr. Pratt in in his response and we 
would be looking at that independently and advised him that I 
would be talking to his supervisor. 
Q And his supervisor is Kent Nielsen? 
A That is correct. 
Q Or at least, was Kent Nielsen? 
And you then did talk to his supervisor about those 
same issues? 
A I did. 
Q And did you in the course of this mention that 
there was a possible problem with John Pratt's contract not 
being in force when he was paid? 
A I don't recall anything specific on the contract 
violation with either one of those individuals. I just don't 
recall specifically. I know I discussed the — our contract 
arrangement and they talked about their concerns and we 
talked about what we were going to do, which basically is we 
were going to do nothing, we were going to allow them to work 
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in the Department. I do not recall discussing specifically 
anything to do with the contract violation. 
Q And when you say contract violation, you're not 
talking about the contract violation alleged between you 
and — 
A It was the contract in process at UDOT. 
MR. BROADBENT: Does the Court have Mr. McCoy's 
original deposition? I believe it's in the packet here. 
THE COURT: Yes, the original deposition of Will 
McCoy taken August 1 of 1990 is in the file with certain 
corrections noted on the front, Counsel. If you're moving to 
publish it, your motion is granted. 
MR. BROADBENT: I would move to publish it. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Mr. McCoy, I direct your 
attention to page 42. Are you there on page 42? 
A I am. 
Q Looking at the bottom there's a question that 
begins on the bottom of page 42 which I'll read, and then 
I'll ask you to read your answer. 
"After the question of Mr. Pratt's violation of his 
agreement had been raised through this letter which I believe 
is the letter from Mr. Hartle's attorney, that you received 
from Mr. Hartle's attorney, did you then meet with the people 
at UDOT and talk about Mr. Pratt's contractual situation?" 
And your answer was? 
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A Okay, would you like me to read — 
Q Yes, please. 
A Okay. "I did. I first met with Lorin Sheffield 
and told Lorin that Mr. Hartle, our prior discussion of me 
bringing him up to date with Mr. Hartle's situation had 
included Mr. Pratt in his defense and I assured him again 
that we did not want to stop the Department or prohibit them 
from getting their work done and we had no desire, you know, 
of filing restraining orders against either one. After that, 
I met with Mr. Nielsen and told him the same thing. I asked 
Mr. Nielsen if he had passed on to Mr. Christensen the 
situation with Mr. Hartle. At that point I had not discussed 
that at all with Mr. Christensen. On becoming aware of the 
payment with Mr. Pratt, I had some additional concerns that 
was — having been the comptroller and having seen the State 
Policy Procurement Board — having been on the Policy Pro-
curement Board for six years, I could not understand how 
Mr, Pratt had contracted with the Department. I knew for a 
fact that he was not on the statewide contract. I had 
installed the controls in the financial system so that kind 
of thing couldn't happen." 
Q And you considered the payment of Mr. Pratt without 
a contract in force as being a violation of State procurement 
Practices; is that correct? 
A That would be correct. 
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Q And you told Mr. Nielsen that you thought UDOT was 
exposed politically in violating — what you considered a 
violation of State procurement practices; is that right? 
A Again, I'm not real sure. In here I say those 
words, but I do not indicate that I told him, you know, 
looking at my notes at some — I honestly don't know. If I 
did, I was aware of that, but I don't know whether I told 
Mr. Nielsen at that time. 
Q Okay. After the meeting with Mr. Nielsen, you went 
downstairs to see Mr. Christensen, didn't you? 
A I did. 
Q Mr. Christensen was not in; is that right? 
A I was on the way to his office and I did meet him 
in the atrium. 
Q Before you met him in the atrium, you ran into 
Harold Worrall; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And you told Mr. Worrall that there was a serious 
situation regarding payment to Mr. Pratt without a contract 
in place that he may want to explore; isn't that right? 
A I did not use those words. What I told Mr. Worrall 
was that in the situation that I had with a couple of con-
tractors, I ran across some information that he should be 
aware of, that he should explore, and there was a possibility 
that a contract was entered into or services entered into 
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before a contract was in place. I suggested he examine that 
himself. 
Q You say you didn't use those exact words? 
A Well, you — what was your word in the beginning? 
Q You said that it was a serious situation that he 
may want to explore. 
A Okay. I expressed it in the terms I did so — 
Q Mr. Christensen then walked by and Mr. Worrall 
stopped him; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And Mr. Worrall was there then, asked that the two 
of you meet with Mr. Christensen; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q The next day you did, in fact, meet with 
Mr. Christensen, didn't you? 
A I did. 
Q And in your meeting with Mr. Christensen you told 
him about John Pratt? 
A I told him about three things. The first is I went 
through the sequence, asked if his staff had brought him up 
to date and had discussed with him the Hartle situation, and 
I went through the explanation of Mr. Hartle. I did advise 
him that Mr. Hartle had brought Mr. Pratt into his defense, 
that we did not intend to do anything with or against the 
Department, that we would handle things separately. I did 
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1 tell him that. 
2 Q Now, when you started your meeting with 
3 Mr. Christensenr Mr. Worrall hadn't arrived yet, had he? 
4 A That is correct. 
5 Q So you had a discussion with Mr. Christensen, just 
6 the two of you; is that correct? 
7 A That is correct. 
8 Q And in the course of that discussion, before 
9 Mr. Worrall arrived, you told Mr. Christensen about the dates 
10 in John Pratt's contract, didn't you? 
11 A Yes, I did. 
12 Q You also told Mr. Christensen that there was this 
13 J contracting problem, that you'd indicated a possible viola-
tion of procurement practices; is that correct? 
A That was after Mr. Worrall joined us. 
Q And in — okay, and then when Mr. Worrall joined 
you, you continued that discussion about this possible 
violation of procurement practices; is that right? 
A Yes, we did have a brief discussion. 
Q You suggested to Mr. Christensen that they may want 
to explore this, didn't you? 
A I don't recall. I think Mr. Worrall was the one 
that — they were the ones that discussed exploring it at 
that point. I don't recollect exactly what I said then. 














Mr. McCoy, on page 58 — I'm sorry, page 56. It's a rather 
lengthy answer and I don't really want to have you read the 
whole thing, so if Counsel doesn't have any objection, I'd 
like you just to continue with the paragraph that starts on 
line 24 of page 56, and just before you do that, let me ask 
you, is this answer, does it relate to this meeting we've 
been talking about that you had with Mr. Christensen? 
A It does. 
Q Take a minute if you need to and just read through. 
A It does. 
Q Okay, and so again, reading, if you will, 
Mr. McCoy, on line 24, page 56 — 
A- "I explained to him the contracting process and 
suggested that's an area that they may want to explore 
because I felt that it had been breached. Mr. Worrall came 
in as we were talking about the contracts. Mr. Worrall 
expressed great concern on the — first of all, he said that 
they did not have a contract in place and that payments had 
been made against that contract with Mr. Pratt." 
Q Okay, we can stop there. 
A Okay. 
Q You later had another meeting with Mr. Christensen 
after this meeting we've been talking about; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And that meeting took place in your office? 
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1 A It did. 
2 Q And Mr. Christensen during that meeting asked for a 
3 copy of Mr. Pratt's contract; is that correct? 
4 I A It was discussed. I don't recall — he asked for a 
5 copy of the language and I think he asked for a copy of his 
6 contract, but I know we did discuss it in some depth. 
7 Q You think he did ask for a copy of his contract? 
8 A I think he did. 
9 Q You told Mr. Christensen that you weren't going to 
10 give him copies of John Pratt's contracts; is that right? 
11 A That is correct. 
12 Q You did, however, give him copies of some forms; is 
13 that right? 
14
 I A That is correct. 
Q Do you recall what forms you gave him? 
A I do. I gave him copies of a standard format for 
what is called our Type I agreement, that is, an employment 
agreement for full-time employed, salaried person. Origi-
nally I thought I had given him a copy of our Type III, which 
is our subcontract agreement. 
During the course of events here, I recalled that 
it was actually a Type II contract agreement which is a part-
time employee and told him that the language used in the 
noncompete was similar or the same as the language used in 













was different, was not exactly the same wording as the 
wording that I was giving him, 
Q You then asked Mr, Christensen what he was going to 
do about Ron Hartle and John Pratt, didn't you? 
A I did not ask that. I asked what he was going to 
do next. 
Q Let's have you look on page 59 of your deposition. 
A Okay. 
Q Again, there is a fairly lengthy answer and I don't 
want you to have to read the entire thing. Is this answer, 
does it relate to this meeting that we've been talking about 
with you and Mr. Christensen? 
A It does. 
Q Would you begin, just read the last paragraph of 
your answer that begins on line 11 on page 59? 
A Okay. The one that starts, "So they were not 
identical"? 
Q Yes. 
A "So they were not identical, but it was the type of 
agreement that we signed with all of our people without 
exception. I asked him at that time, I tried to get an idea 
where he was at and what he was going to do, and his comment 
was that they were still researching it and analyzing it and 
he wasn't at liberty to discuss any more." 
Q When you say you tried to get an idea of where he 
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was at and what he was going to do, that has reference to 
what he was going to do about the John Pratt and Ron Hartle 
situation; isn't that right? 
A It was that, the contracting situation, yes. 
Q You then had another contact with Mr. Christensen 
of UDOT on the following Monday, October 2nd; is that 
correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And Mr. Christensen called you and reported what 
he'd done about Ron Hartle and John Pratt; is that correct? 
A Mr. Christensen called several times. We played 
telephone tag. When we finally did talk, he asked if I could 
come in and talk. He advised me what he had done with 
Mr. Hartle and Mr. Pratt and advised me that our contracts 
would also cease. 
Q Mr. McCoy, John Pratt gave written notice of 
terminating his subcontract agreement, didn't he? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q And the notice was given on or about February 27th; 
is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And so his subcontract terminated 30 days later, on 
or about March 29th of 1989; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And so he had a noncompete agreement in the 
150 
A Would you restate your question? I'm concerned 
about the time frame because — 
Q Okay. At no time have you ever told anyone at UDOT 
that Mr. Pratt's contract, his noncompetition obligation to 
Pro-Star had lapsed when they terminated him; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Now, when you found out about Mr. Pratt, you had 
already had some discussions with people at UDOT about 
Mr. Hartle; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And after you found out about Mr. Pratt, you 
basically talked about Mr. Pratt and Mr. Hartle together when 
you talked to people at UDOT; is that correct? 
A That is correct. The time period was very, very 
short. 
Q As your attorney said yesterday, you basically 
dealt with him as a package; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q And all of your relationships and conversations 
with UDOT in this time frame we've been talking about, and, 
in fact, since January of 1989, have been on behalf of Pro-
Star; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Let me refer you now to Exhibit 30 to begin with. 
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it with out attorney and that we were concerned with the no 
compete issue being consistent and that he could call the 
attorney. I gave him Eric's name, the company and telephone 
number. Mr. Pratt left and that's the last contact I really 
had, other than just the physical view." 
Q On October 2nd, 1989, the date that Mr. Pratt's 
contract at UDOT was terminated, some of your staff were also 
terminated by UDOT, weren't they? 
A I was informed that they would be terminated that 
same day. 
Q In fact, they were actually terminated, weren't 
they? 
A They were told that they would be terminated the 
day I contacted DOT, the following day, and they continued 
work. 
Q You immediately contacted Mr. Christensen at UDOT, 
didn't you? 
A I called Mr. Harold Worrall first. I tried — 
attempted Mr. Christensen and he had gone home for the day. 
Q And the next day you contacted Mr. Christensen? 
A I did. 
Q And your staff was then allowed back into UDOT that 
next day? 
A Our agreement, when Mr. Christensen called me into 
his office the 2nd of October, the commitment was that our 
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people would be terminated in the shortest period of time 
possible and he asked me to work with our people and with his 
staff to come to a logical conclusion as rapidly as possible 
in either phase or task and our people would no longer work 
there. 
Q In any event, you didn't have to resolve anything 
with Mr. Pratt before you could get your people back into 
UDOT, did you? 
A I did not. 
Q When you joined UDOT in 1980, Mr. Findlay was 
comptroller at UDOT; is that correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q Is that when you met Mr. Findlay? 
A Yes, it is. 
Q And you first met — 
A I'm sorry, I take it back. I met him about six 
months to a year earlier than that when I was with the U.S. 
Department of Transportation for some period of time. 
Q And you worked under Mr. Findlay when you first 
joined the Utah Department of Transportation, didn't you? 
A I did not. 
Q Who did you work under? 
A I worked in a dual reporting responsibility to the 
director, Mr. Bill Hurley, and to the Utah Transportation 
Commission. 
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bitter, he had some negative words about our company, and I 
asked our employees that it would be best if they stayed away 
from him because his attitude was not the best and I told 
them that he did not care for Pro-Star. 
Q You're not aware of anything bad that John Pratt's 
done or that you would consider bad, are you? 
A I'm not. 
Q You never told anybody that John Pratt's done 
anything bad, have you? 
A No, I have not. 
MR. BROADBENT: Your Honor, we move to admit 
Exhibits 30 through 32. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. OLSON: None, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well, they're received. 
MR. BROADBENT: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Before you start your cross-
examination, if you intend to proceed in that fashion — I 
presume you do. 
MR. OLSON: Just a few clarifying questions. 
THE COURT: We'll take a brief recess. Members of 
the jury, remember the admonition I've given you. 
Court will take a 10-minute recess. 
(Whereupon, a recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Jury, parties and counsel are present. 
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THE COURT: Objection as to foundation is 
sustained. 
MR. BROADBENT: Could we approach the bench, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, let's not make too much 
of a habit of this. My reason for sustaining the objection 
is that we don't have any basis at this point to know when 
any conversation occurred that would lead us to conclude that 
it's relevant, so let's have further foundation as to when 
the conversation that's going to be testified to occurred. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Okay. When did the conversa-
tion take place, Mr. Clawson? 
A Probably in late February, early March. 
Q Okay, and tell us what Mr. McCoy said in that 
conversation. 
MR. OLSON: Your Honor, I again object as to 
relevance in time. It's six months before the events that 
are at issue in this case. 
THE COURT: Well, we're talking about February or 
March of 1989, at the time this witness was employed at Pro-
Star? 
MR. BROADBENT: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Well, Counsel, I'm going to overrule 
the objection. You may testify. 
THE WITNESS: We were on our way to one of the 
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clients in the state and the subject of John Pratt came up 
and the gist of the conversation was that Will was unhappy 
with John Pratt's conduct of terminating his contract and 
going to work directly for a client. He felt — his comments 
were the frame that it was unethical and he was quite unhappy 
with John. 
Q From being at Pro-Star in this two-month period, 
did you know where John Pratt was working before he termi-
nated with Pro-Star? 
A It was up at an office there on Social Hall Avenue. 
I believe it was the Department of Transportation or — I'm 
not sure just what department at the time. 
Q So you're not sure what department, but Mr. McCoy 
was upset because he thought that John Pratt had done some-
thing wrong? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: Counsel, there's no reason to restate 
the answer of a witness. He's your witness. 
MR. BROADBENT: I have no further questions, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, you may cross-examine. 
MR. BROADBENT: Excuse me. Before we do that, I'd 
like to ask the witness to, if you would, place on this time 
line — we'll use yellow — the time frame in which this 




THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (By Mr. Broadbent) Did you later have any other 
conversations with Will McCoy in which John Pratt was 
mentioned? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q When was the next conversation that you remember 
having with him? 
A I believe it was on May 3rd, 1989. 
Q And what did Mr. McCoy say on that occasion about 
John Pratt? 
A He was telling me that he believed that I should 
not have any dealings with Mr. Pratt because he believed that 
he was a bad influence on me. 
Q Did he say anything else? 
A He said that he had done several things that were 
professional unethical and that he — he said that he could 
not elaborate, but he said that he had done things that were 
far worse than anything I knew about. 
Q Did you know about anything unethical that 
Mr. Pratt had done? 
A The only thing that I had known about that could 
even be construed in my mind as touching upon a lack of 
ethics was his transition from being a Pro-Star employee to a 
subcontractor. 
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both of them; isn't that right? 
A Yes, he was — he had been working overtime for 
Employment Security so he would have a reserve fund of time 
that could be used so that he could be satisfying both 
clients. 
Q And when he left Employment Security, he left 
things in a lurch there, did he not? 
A No, he did not. 
Q So it didn't make any difference that the leader of 
Pro-Star's team at Employment Security was withdrawing from 
the project? 
A No, it did not. 
Q Worked just fine for you? 
A Yes. 
Q And Pro-Star never was concerned about that? 
A Mr. McCoy never expressed any concern that 
Mr. Pratt had pulled out of Employment Security at the time 
that he did. He didn't express any concern to me. 
Q Now, when Mr. Pratt or Mr. McCoy spoke with you in 
mid April of 1989 and asked you where John Pratt was working, 
at that time was it your understanding when he asked you that 
question, that he didn't know where John Pratt was working? 
A It was. 
Q Okay. 
A He had ~ 
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Q Anything else that you remember from reading that? 
A That is the point of this page. 
Q Would you continue, if you would, down through your 
answer through line 15 on page 33, Mr. Christensen? Just 
read through that. 
Does that further refresh your recollection about 
anything — 
A Yeah. 
Q — that happened? 
Tell us now what you remember. 
A Well, Mr. McCoy stated that he didn't want a 
lawsuit with UDOT and UDOT didn't want to dirty their name up 
and they were just going to have a business arrangement to 
clear up the matter. 
Q Okay. Now, you'd mentioned previously that you 
were out at the Utah Department of Transportation. 
A Correct. 
Q And how long were you there? 
A Off and on for about three weeks. 
Q In what time frame? 
A September, I believe. I came back off my vacation 
September 1st or 2nd, I think, so it would be about September 
5th. 
Q Okay, and what were you working on when you were 
working out at UDOT? 
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circumstances was and I told him the same thing. 
Shortly after that, or I think it was the same 
telephone conversation, I got a call — I talked to Bill 
Basham who is the owner of Pro-Star/Prodata and at that time 
he indicated that he would take whatever means he could to 
get me out of UDOT. 
Q Now, after you stopped doing subcontract work for 
Pro-Star, did you continue then doing computer consulting 
work? 
A Yes, I did at UDOT. 
Q And did you have an arrangement or a contract with 
UDOT? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you have a contract with them? 
A Yes. 
Q And following this discussion that you just testi-
fied about with Mr. McCoy and Mr. Basham on the telephone, 
was your contract with UDOT terminated? 
A Shortly thereafter, yes. There were some things 
that happened in the meantime, though, because I had inter-
action and had interaction all along with my attorney con-
cerning the legality of what I was doing and I was assured 
that it was perfectly legal. 
Q When was your contract at UDOT terminated? 
A On October 2nd, 1989. 
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Q And as I recall, you've been in business both with 
him and with Bill Basham, who was now the president of 
Prodata; is that correct? 
A I was not a partner in that business• I was just 
an employee as they were. 
Q But you were all in that business together? 
A That's right. 
Q That was a consulting business; is that correct? 
A That's right. 
Q Mr. Worrall, I direct your attention now back to 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 that you've testified about, and you've 
indicated that this memo was prepared by you? 
A That's right, myself and Gary Williams, chief 
accountant. 
Q And it was prepared based upon your investigation 
of certain facts? 
A That's correct. 
Q Did anyone request that you prepare this memo? 
A Yes. Well, no, not the memo, but requested me to 
go back and look at the documents, as I indicated earlier. 
Q And that was Neal Christensen that requested that? 
A No, that was Will McCoy. 
Q So Will McCoy requested that you go and look at 
some documents, and as a result of that request, you did an 
investigation and prepared this memo which is Plaintiff's 
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Exhibit 6? 
A That's correct• 
Q I direct your attention for a moment to paragraph 2 
of this exhibit. Would you read that paragraph to the jury, 
please? 
A "An existing contract between UDOT and Pro-Star was 
amended upward for an additional $72,000 and extended from 
1-1-89 through 9-1-89. This was for ISS DP chargeback work, 
according to back-up contract documentation." 
Q Wasn't there, in fact, an additional contract 
between UDOT and Pro-Star in effect at this time? 
A Apparently there was, according to this. 
Q And wasn't Pro-Star being paid under that other 
contract, as well as the one that you reference here that's 
been extended through September 1, 1989? 
A You mean another contract other than mentioned here 
in this memo? 
Q Yes. 
A There was another contract with Pro-Star. I'm not 
sure what services it was for, though, I mean, what specific 
system. 
Q As you sit here today, do you have a recollection 
whether that other contract had expired as of the date of 
this memo? 
A I don't. 
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Q Do you have a recollection as to whether Pro-Star 
was being paid under the other contract as of the date of 
this memo? 
A Which was September f89. I don't know whether that 
contract ran out June 30th or not. 
Q You have previously read to the jury paragraph 3 
of this memo. Would you take just a moment and look at that 
again? 
A Yes. 
Q The information that's in paragraph 3 didn't come 
from any documents that are on file at UDOT, did it? 
A No. 
Q In fact, the comptroller's office doesn't keep any 
documents that would give you that information, does it? 
A That's correct. 
Q That information, in fact, came from Mr. McCoy; 
isn't that correct? 
A I would think so. I don't recall exactly where we 
got that, but I'm sure that's probably the case. 
Q And you never reviewed any documents provided to 
you by Mr. McCoy in making those statements in paragraph 3? 
A No. 
Q And you never talked to John Pratt about any of the 
information in that paragraph before writing this memo? 
A I did not, no. 
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Q Did anyone under your direction talk to Mr. Pratt 
before preparing this memo? 
A I'm not aware of it if they did. 
Q So in fact, you had really no way of knowing 
whether the statements in paragraph 3 of this memo were true, 
did you? 
A I didn't at that time. 
Q Looking now to paragraph 6 of this memo, you've 
previously read a portion of that paragraph and I won't have 
you read that again, but I'll direct your attention to the 
same place there beginning with the third sentence in para-
graph 6. 
A Which begins? 
Q With, "John Pratt was employed with Pro-Star." 
A In paragraph 6? 
Q Yes. Do you see that? It's the third or probably 
the fourth. Maybe I'm missing a sentence. 
A Okay. 
Q Do you see the sentence that says, "John Pratt was 
employed with Pro-Star for a partial period"? 
A Yes. 
Q And that sentence, likewise, you had no documents 
that would indicate that that was the case, did you? 
A That's probably true. 
Q You never saw an employment contract between John 
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Pratt and Pro-Star, did you? 
A Not at that time, no. 
Q You never talked to John Pratt about his employment 
with Pro-Star? 
A No. 
Q So the only place you could have got this informa-
tion would have been from Mr. McCoy; is that true? 
A That, and I also had the assumption working in that 
business, the understanding that you have various noncompete 
clauses with various companies when you're under contract 
with them. You understand that situation and assume that to 
be the case. Kind of standard. 
Q Now, this sentence — and maybe I'm not reading it 
the same way you intended it, but this sentence, as I under-
stand it, doesn't refer to any noncompete provision, and you 
correct me if I'm wrong. Doesn't this sentence say that John 
Pratt was employed during the same period of time that he was 
rendering services for UDOT, that he was employed by Pro-Star 
during that same period of time? 
A Partial period, right. 
Q So that's not referring to a noncompete clause, is 
it? 
A I'm not sure whether it would or not. Depends on 
whether he was a subcontractor or whether he was an employee 
or what their arrangements were. 
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Q And that's not spelled out here in this paragraph 
anywhere? 
A No. 
Q Or anywhere else in the memo? 
A No. My major concern was with the contractual 
arrangements and the payments that we made as Utah Department 
of Transportation, not John Pratt or Ron Hartle or Prodata, 
for that matter. 
Q And so you really had no way of knowing whether 
this statement about John Pratt's employment in paragraph 6 
was true, did you? 
A That's true, probably true. 
Q And this memo was provided to Mr. Findlay? 
A That's correct. 
Q And it was provided so that he could then use this 
information to make some decision about this matter; is that 
correct? 
A The major thing that I had a responsibility to do 
was to point out the facts of the contractual arrangements 
and the payment to the executive director of the Department 
for his action. Once I became aware of this, had I not acted 
and an auditor came along behind and found this sort of 
contractual arrangement going and this sort of payment 
process going on, I'd be in severe difficulties with the 




To prove intentional misrepresentation, the plaintiff must 
prove by clear and convincing evidence: 
1. That the defendants made a false statement about 
a presently existing fact. 
2. That the defendants knew the statement to be 
false, or recklessly made the statement without sufficient 
knowledge. 
3. That the defendants intended to induce the Utah 
Department of Transportation to act in reliance on the false 
statement. 
4. That the Utah Department of Transportation did in 
fact act with justification on the false statement. 
Intentional misrepresentation is never presumed. It is a 
wrong of such a nature that merely speculative evidence or even 
the simple preponderance of evidence already discussed will not 
suffice. Each element of intentional misrepresentation must be 
proven by evidence that is clear and convincing. Such proof 
makes the existence of a fact not just more probable than not, 
but highly probable. Clear and convincing evidence is precise 
and undubitable, unmistakable and free from serious or 
substantial doubt. It carries with it not only the power to 
persuade the mind as to the truth or probable correctness of 
the fact it purports to prove, but has the element of clinching 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ° 
Page Two 
in the mind such truth or correctness. Clear and convincing 
evidence of intentional misrepresentation instantly tilts the 
scales in the affirmative, when weighed against the evidence in 
opposition, and, your minds as finders of the facts are left 
with an abiding conviction that the charges as to each element 
of V&4f&2!im 
If the plaintiff fails to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence any one of these facts, then you must find that there 
was no intentional misrepresentation. 
INSTRUCTION NO, 
The actionable false statement must relate to a presently 
existing fact. The mere expression of a judgment or an opinion 
cannot serve as the basis for a finding of intentional 
misrepresentation. The plaintiff has the burden of proving 
this element of intentional misrepresentation by clear and 
convincing evidence. If you find that the defendants only 
stated their honest opinion or judgment to the Utah Department 
of Transportation, then the plaintiff has failed to prove 
actionable intentional misrepresentation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
The false statement must be made with knowledge of or 
reckless disregard for its falsity. If you find that the 
defendants had no knowledge of the falsity of any statement made 
to the Utah Department of Transportation and did not act with 
reckless disregard for the truth of such statement, then the 
plaintiff has failed to prove an intentional misrepresentation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. X 
The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that the defendants intended to induce the Utah 
Department of Transportation to act in reliance on their false 
statement. In other words, the defendants, in communicating 
with UDOT, must have intended to cause UDOT to rely on the 
allegedly false statement. If you find that the plaintiff has 
not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant 
acted with such an intent, then the plaintiff has failed to 
prove intentional misrepresentation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that any reliance of the Utah Department of 
Transportation on the false information was actual and 
justifiable. Proof that UDOT made an independent investigation, 
unhindered by the defendants, regarding those facts allegedly 
misrepresented by the defendants contradicts the fact proposition 
that UDOT actually relied upon the defendants' statements. 
Further, where the means to discover the truth of an alleged 
misstatement lies in the hands of the person allegedly deceived 
and ordinary prudence would have uncovered the truth, reliance is 
not justifiable. If you find that any alleged reliance was not 
actual and justifiable, then the plaintiff has failed to prove an 
intentional misrepresentation. 
